The response to this tweet has been so large that it even touched my economics-packed Twitter feed (via Noah Smith). Noah has a relatively reasonable response to the idea that "scientific facts are social constructs," although I am still annoyed about his misguided use of the word "anti-rationalism" to describe anti-intellectual or anti-science arguments.
Noah's ignorance of philosophy is fitting, because I (unlike Jason Smith, who called the ensuing argument an "utter philosophical mess") think that most people have failed to understand that this argument is really all about philosophy; specifically, philosophy of science. I think both Jason (and somewhat Noah) focused too much on the word "social" and too little on what "social" and "constructs" mean together -- namely that scientific facts (which are really theories or their predictions) are socially constructed and therefore do not refer to things in the real world.
This is scientific anti-realism, or the idea that scientific theories don't or can't interact with reality. It's probably better to look at anti-realism through the lens of scientific realism. A scientific realist would say that scientific theories are either true or will eventually converge to truth given enough time and resources. Anti-realists are skeptical of the truth of scientific facts for various reasons -- for instance, the anthropology professor would probably say that society influences the scientific process such that the results it achieves are not true. Thomas Kuhn (or at least many readers of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) would argue that "scientific facts" are inherently influenced by the prevailing paradigm.
The folly of scientists in this case has been to unwittingly invoke their realism in attempts to mock anti-realists. Neil deGrasse Tyson's tweet was particularly ironic:
Dr. Tyson argued against the mere assertion of scientific anti-realism by asserting his own philosophical position (without making any arguments for it, I might add).
Jason concedes that scientific facts in the past have been social constructs:
The problem with Jason's blog post is that he did precious little to defend his scientific realism before asking if we can "get away from the philosophical argy bargy." As the only economics blogger I can remember referring to Popperian falsificationism, I am more than a little bit disappointed (and frankly annoyed) at his dismissal of the philosophical argument here.
Personally, I don't even agree with "scientific facts are social constructs." I just hate the arrogance of people in their ignorance. There are better arguments for why science is worthwhile, and reasonably objective than just assuming that to be the case. My favorite is pragmatism (which should appeal to the effective-theory-espousing Jason Smith), which basically sees the empirical successes of science as reasons for us to act as if scientific realism is true.
I think Pierce's formulation of truth, while being as far from succinct as it is possible to be, is a good description of a pragmatic view of science:
Honestly, though, any defense of scientific realism (even Noah Smith's argument that anti-realism is counterproductive because it fosters anti-rationalism -- more accurately anti-scientific beliefs) is better than "but scientific facts exist because we have smart phones."
Noah's ignorance of philosophy is fitting, because I (unlike Jason Smith, who called the ensuing argument an "utter philosophical mess") think that most people have failed to understand that this argument is really all about philosophy; specifically, philosophy of science. I think both Jason (and somewhat Noah) focused too much on the word "social" and too little on what "social" and "constructs" mean together -- namely that scientific facts (which are really theories or their predictions) are socially constructed and therefore do not refer to things in the real world.
This is scientific anti-realism, or the idea that scientific theories don't or can't interact with reality. It's probably better to look at anti-realism through the lens of scientific realism. A scientific realist would say that scientific theories are either true or will eventually converge to truth given enough time and resources. Anti-realists are skeptical of the truth of scientific facts for various reasons -- for instance, the anthropology professor would probably say that society influences the scientific process such that the results it achieves are not true. Thomas Kuhn (or at least many readers of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) would argue that "scientific facts" are inherently influenced by the prevailing paradigm.
The folly of scientists in this case has been to unwittingly invoke their realism in attempts to mock anti-realists. Neil deGrasse Tyson's tweet was particularly ironic:
Jason concedes that scientific facts in the past have been social constructs:
One of my [favorite examples] is the aether. That was a "scientific fact" that was a "social construct": humans thought "waves" traveled in "a medium", and therefore needed a medium for light waves to travel in. This turned out to be unnecessary, and it is possible that someone reading a power point slide that said "scientific facts are social constructs" might have gotten from the aether to special relativity a bit faster.Another example is the geocentric model of the solar system, which is relatively empirically accurate yet no longer accepted as an explanation for planetary movements. The anti-realist argument is simply that there is no reason to believe we are completely right this time, let alone that we will eventually be right about everything.
The problem with Jason's blog post is that he did precious little to defend his scientific realism before asking if we can "get away from the philosophical argy bargy." As the only economics blogger I can remember referring to Popperian falsificationism, I am more than a little bit disappointed (and frankly annoyed) at his dismissal of the philosophical argument here.
Personally, I don't even agree with "scientific facts are social constructs." I just hate the arrogance of people in their ignorance. There are better arguments for why science is worthwhile, and reasonably objective than just assuming that to be the case. My favorite is pragmatism (which should appeal to the effective-theory-espousing Jason Smith), which basically sees the empirical successes of science as reasons for us to act as if scientific realism is true.
I think Pierce's formulation of truth, while being as far from succinct as it is possible to be, is a good description of a pragmatic view of science:
Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth.Basically, truth (in the pragmatic sense) is what science would come up with given infinite resources and infinite time.
Honestly, though, any defense of scientific realism (even Noah Smith's argument that anti-realism is counterproductive because it fosters anti-rationalism -- more accurately anti-scientific beliefs) is better than "but scientific facts exist because we have smart phones."
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